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preferable to the present capricious system. Though still inequitable to
those most seriously injured, similar statutes have survived equal protec4
tion scrutiny elsewhere. '
While of little theoretical value, Foreman does serve to question the

ultimate importance of the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity.
Arbitrary refusal to pay justly adjudicated debts is hardly the result for
which legal scholars campaigned in urging the abrogation of the doctrine.
A desire for governmental accountability and responsibility bred the revolution which vitiated sovereign immunity, and Foreman is a poor vindication of both policies.
William Hardy Patrick II1

Elrod v. Burns:
CONSTITUTIONAL JOB SECURITY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES?

Four unclassified employees of the Sheriff's office in Cook County,

Illinois, brought suit in federal court to enjoin their dismissals by the
newly-elected Democrat. Plaintiffs, all Republicans, alleged that their
discharges' were based solely on the fact that they neither supported nor
were members of the Democratic Party and had failed to obtain the
upon recovery against the state, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-113 (1973) ($100,000
per person; $300,000 per occurrence); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270 (1975) ($100,000 per
person; $300,000 per occurrence; $50,000 damage to property); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19(3) (1970) ($100,000 per person; $300,000 per occurrence;
$100,000 damage to property); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 (1972) ($75,000 per
person; $300,000 per negligent act).
41. State of Nevada v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 (1971); cf. Hall v.
Gillens, 13 111.2d. 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958). One court has recently held that
limitations placed upon recovery in malpractice actions are unconstitutional. Wright
v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n. 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). See Comment, Recent Medical MalpracticeLegislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV.
655 (1976). The rationales are clearly distinguishable because in the malpractice
limitation, a common law right to full recovery was vitiated, whereas in sovereign
immunity, the state creates both the right and the remedy. Its power to limit the
maximum recovery in the right that it creates thereby differs from its power to
abrogate pre-existing common law rights.
1. Three employees had already been discharged while one alleged that he was
in imminent danger of dismissal. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, 1986, 1988 (1970).
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2
sponsorship of one of its leaders. Resolving a conflict among the circuits,
the United States Supreme Court held that the practice of patronage
dismissal violates the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States

Constitution 3 and that the employees had stated a proper claim for relief.
Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976).
The "spoils system" is the use of government jobs, contracts, and
other discretionary benefits by officeholders to reward political supporters

for party services. Though the practice has been drastically curtailed by
the imposition of merit employment systems and public bidding laws, it
has remained a potent political tool, especially at state and local levels of

government. 4 Patronage discharge is perhaps the most dramatic aspect of
the system and has come under increasing attack recently in the courts and
in legal publications. 5 Its opponents maintain that conditioning public
employment on party affiliation unduly inhibits free political belief and
association.
The right of association to advance one's political beliefs is derived
from the first amendment as a necessary concomitance to the exercise of
2. Compare Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1113 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S.Ct. 2673
(1976) and Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973) with Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975) and Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. First amendment protections were made available against state action by the passage of the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
4. The spoils system's continued viability is attested to by the fact that in 1970
over 2000 Republican employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
were fired by the incoming Democratic administration. American Fed'n of State,
County & Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 528, 280 A.2d 375, 376 (1971).
The following year, 1946 Democratic workers in the Illinois Secretary of State's
office were also discharged en masse for allegedly partisan reasons. Illinois State
Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 578 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
928 (1973).
5. See O'Neil, Politics, Patronage,and Public Employment, 44 U. CIN. L.
REV. 725 (1975); Comment, Freedom of Association-PoliticalAffiliations of NonCivil Service Employees, 7 SUFF. L. REV. 1098 (1974); Comment, PatronageDismissals: Constitutional Limits and PoliticalJustifications, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 297
(1974); Note, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1320 (1972); Note, 4 Loy. CHI. L.J. 459 (1973); Note,
34 U. Pirr. L. REV. 699 (1973); Note, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1090 (1973); Note, 14 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 720 (1973).
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its explicitly guaranteed freedoms. 6 Since victims of patronage dismissals
must give up their jobs to remain members of the party of their choice, an
obvious burden is placed on the exercise of their right of association.
Nevertheless, only the Seventh Circuit, which rendered the decision reviewed in Elrod, had previously found the practice to be constitutionally
infirm. 7 Other courts had circumvented the constitutional question by
either characterizing government employment as a "privilege" which
could be terminated at will or by holding that employees who had accepted
patronage positions had impliedly "waived" their right to challenge
subsequent discharge on the same basis. 8
6. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441,449(1974); Kusper
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615
(1971).
7. Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976);
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 928 (1973); Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971).
8. No prior Supreme Court decisions were found dealing with the issue. See,
e.g., Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005
(1975) (waiver); Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1020 (1972) (right-privilege). The decisions which relied on a "right-privilege"
distinction (that is, the government can condition employment as it pleases, even
upon the surrender of constitutional rights, since there exists no affirmative right to
a government job) ignored a long line of Supreme Court decisions indicating that the
doctrine was no longer a valid tool in constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 605-06 (1967); Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 281 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926): "It
would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which
[expressly divests constitutional rights], but to uphold an act by which the same
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a
valuable privilege .... ." See Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2683 (1976).
The waiver argument was raised in Elrod but disposed of in a footnote in which
the Court said that since appropriate justification was required to validate patronage practice, "[a] finding of waiver in this case ... would be contrary to our view
that a partisan job qualification abridges the First Amendment." 96 S. Ct. at 2683
n.13. This seems to imply that such rights cannot be waived but, traditionally,
constitutional rights may be waived if done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). It is not clear
whether the Elrod Court would follow those decisions (which deal with criminal
and regulatory law) and allow an express written waiver or would simply hold that it
could not be truly voluntary where sought and given in return for a government job,
a form of economic coercion. See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676,691,692 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
The parallel notion of estoppel is inapplicable, despite the inconsistency of
patronage employees challenging the same means by which they may have secured
their jobs, since it would be their own party that arguably relied on their conduct
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In a long series of decisions, culminating in Perry v. Sindermann,9
the Supreme Court has ruled that mere status as a public servant does not
deprive one of the protection against prohibited governmental action that
the Constitution affords. 10 In Perry, the Court held that a non-tenured state
college professor could not be dismissed for publicly criticizing the
policies of the school's Board of Regents. Whether the plaintiff had a
contractual right to his position or not was immaterial to his claim that he
had been fired in retaliation for exercising his first amendment right of free
speech." A companion case, Board of Regents v. Roth,12 limited the
practical effects of the Perry decision, by holding that the procedural due
process requirements of notice and an impartial hearing prior to termination do not attach unless the plaintiff can show either a contractual right to
his job or that his discharge damaged his reputation or future employability.13 Absent such a showing, the state need not give any reason for
dismissal, and a public employee must turn to the courts and prove that he
was fired for a constitutionally impermissible reason. Thus Roth may
restrict the availability of the constitutional protection promised in Perry.
The two concurring Justices in Elrod found the Court's decision in
Perry to be dispositive of the issue presented. 14 The plurality, although
and not an official of the opposition elected several years after they were hired.
Further, the Court found, inter alia, that the absence of partisan dismissals would
not prove a substantial detriment to either political parties or the state itself. See,
e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 322-23 (1935); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267
U.S. 307 (1925); Watson v. Gray, 48 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1950). But cf. Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1935) (Brandeis, J., concurring): "The Court will not
pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed
himself of its benefits."
9. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
11. 408 U.S. at 597-98.
12. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
13. Id. at 573, 577. Roth held that procedural due process protection only
applies if the plaintiff had a property interest in the government benefit or can show
that its termination deprives him of his liberty. "To have a property interest in a
benefit, a person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it . . . he
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. at 577. Since a
patronage employee normally will have no contract, express or implied, termination
alone is not a sufficient reason to invoke due process protections. See Nunnery v.
Barber, 503 F.2d 1349, 1352 n. 10 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975);
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 563 n.l (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
14. 96 S.Ct. at 2690 (Blackmun and Stewart, JJ., concurring). Justice Powell
wrote a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist concur-
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agreeing that partisan discharge falls within the broad prohibitions of that
case, 15 noted that first amendment rights are not absolute and that their
exercise can be restrained for appropriate reasons.' 6 The proffered justification, however, has to survive the strictest judicial scrutiny when tested
against a formidable standard derived from several prior decisions. First,
the government has the burden of proving the existence of some vital, as
opposed to merely legitimate, state interest which is furthered by the
practice of patronage dismissal. Second, the Court required that patronage
dismissal be the means of furthering that interest least restrictive of first
amendment freedoms. Finally, "the benefit gained must outweigh the loss
17
of constitutionally protected rights.'
red. Id. at 2691. Both the plurality and the dissent agreed that the issue was not a
"political question" since that doctrine only bars jurisdiction where the question
should be resolved by a co-equal branch of the federal government. Id. at 2679,
2691 n.l. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Chief Justice Burger also
dissented separately, principally on the ground that the Court was unwarrantedly
interfering with state internal policy. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S.
Ct. 2465 (1976) (decision dealt with an encroachment by Congress on the states'
rights to set wage scales for their own employees; there was no allegation that the
employees' constitutional rights were being infringed). The other dissenters also
seemed to think that the necessity of patronage to the democratic process should be
decided by the state legislatures, which had already curtailed the practice through
civil service laws. 96 S.Ct. at 2695. But, as the dissent itself pointed out, merit
systems were a response to the corruption bred by widespread patronage practice,
not a judgment on the constitutionality of the system. Id. at 2692. It may be naive to
suppose that legislators, who depend on party support at the local level, would risk
the wrath of local party bosses and outlaw the practice completely. See Note, 57
IOWA L. REV. 1320, 1351-53 (1972). The plurality again disposed of the question by
limiting the "separation of powers" principle to coordinate branches of the national
government. 96 S. Ct. at 2679. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision. Id. at
2690.
15. 96 S. Ct. at 2683. "Since the average public employee is hardly in the
financial position to support his party and another, or to lend his time to two parties,
the individual's ability 'to act according to his beliefs and to associate with others of
his political persuasion is constrained, and support for his party is diminished ...
Patronage thus tips the electoral process in favor of the incumbent party, and where
the practice's scope is substantial relative to the size of the electorate, the impact on
the process can be significant." Id. at 2681.
16. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960). The criteria used to test the
constitutionality of any restraint have become progressively more stringent. Compare NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) and United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947) with United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265

(1967) and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
17. 96 S. Ct. at 2685. The first two requirements were derived, from the
following decisions dealing with government action infringing first amendment
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The appellants in Elrod contended that three important interests are

furthered by patronage and justify the infringement of individual rights it
entails. 8 First, they claimed it leads to more effective government since
members of the incumbent party will work hard to ensure their party's
continuation in office and thus their jobs; members of the opposition, if
retained, presumably would be inefficient in order to discredit the party in
office. 9 The Court found that the connection between patronage and
efficiency is somewhat tenuous and that discharge for cause is a less
restrictive means to accomplish that end. Next, it was argued that partisan

discharge is necessary to prevent obstruction of the new administration's
policies. Quite logically, the Court found that this interest can be ade-

quately served by limiting the partisan discharge to employees holding
policymaking positions. 20 Finally, the state argued that patronage is an
indispensable political tool of the major parties and that the latter are
necessary institutions for the maintenance of American democracy. The
plurality cited the drastic curtailment of the spoils system since the inceprights: Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59
(1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31-33 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 265 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 464-66 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
The final part of the test was taken from United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 96 (1947).
18. 96 S. Ct. at 2684-88.
19. Id. at 2685. The plurality referred to a line of decisions that dealt with
statutory provisions forbidding members of the Communist Party from holding
certain public jobs. Such statutory presumptions of subversiveness have been
invalidated in several cases as constituting an unreasonable classification violative
of due process. There seems to be even less justification to presume obstructiveness or inefficiency on the part of members of the major political parties. See, e.g.,
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 608-09 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966). Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
20. The Court indicated that the government should bear the burden of proving
that any particular employee had been in a policymaking position. Acknowledging
that no absolute distinction between policymaking and non-policymaking positions
could be fashioned, the plurality said that primary consideration should be given to
the breadth and scope of responsibilities attached to a position and whether an
employee was found to be an "advisor or formulates plans for the implementation
of broad goals." 96 S. Ct. at 2687. The problem of distinguishing policymaking
positions has worried both the judiciary and the commentators. See Nunnery v.
Barber, 503 F.2d 1349, 1353-58 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975);
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 578 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973). See authorities cited in note 5, supra. Some case-bycase adjudication following the Court's guidelines should lead to a more precise
delineation and help avoid the twin fears of a "multiplicity of frivolous lawsuits"
and establishment of a "super civil service commission" in the federal courts.
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tion of civil service regulations as evidence that elimination of partisan
dismissals will not lead to the collapse of the two-party system. 2' Further,
any gain to the electoral process due to the increased political involvement
required of patronage workers was seen as more than offset by the
22
resultant entrenchment of two parties, to the exclusion of others.
The result reached in Elrod follows the pattern of recent decisions
invalidating, as penalties for exercising first amendment rights, denials of
government benefits, including employment. 23 Nevertheless, some doubts
remain as to whether the outcome was correct, how the validity of other
aspects of the patronage system is affected, and the decision's efficacy as a
prohibition to partisan discharge.
The plurality minimized the patronage system's contribution to the
continued viability of the major parties and the latter's role in the electoral
process.2" As the dissent pointed out, however, the major parties are
highly visible, permanent institutions that voters "can and do hold. . . to
long term accountability"; help simplify the complexity of today's lengthy
ballots; and assure "the winners of a general election sufficient support to
govern effectively. "25 Undeniably, patronage is an effective tool used by
local politicians to obtain contributions of time and money with which to
support party efforts in less than prestigious election campaigns and to run
party offices on a daily basis. Though special interest groups, such as
labor unions, are becoming increasingly involved in party politics,
whether they can or will provide substantial support at the local level,
where the benefits to be reaped for their causes are relatively insignificant,
is far from certain.2 6 Further, the wisdom of increasing the dependence of
21. See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31-32 (1968); Note, 57 IowA L.
REV. 1320, 1346 (1972); Note, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1090, 1098 (1973).
22. The justifications offered by the appellants and several other possible state
interests furthered by patronage practice are discussed at length and found insufficient to validate the practice of patronage discharge in Comment, PatronageDismissals: ConstitutionalLimits and PoliticalJustifications,41 U. CHI. L. REV. 297,
327-28 (1974) and Note, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1320, 1324-27, 1342-50 (1972).
23. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1%8); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). Contra, United States Civ. Serv. Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).

24. 96 S.Ct. at 2687-88.
25. Id. at 2694, quoting from Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974).
26. Id. But see Note, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1090, 1098 (1973), where the author
surmises that a curtailment of patronage will only deplete a traditional source of
voluntary political workers and will not lead to the demise of parties because of the
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parties, and thus elected officials, upon the generosity of large pressure
groups, instead of the individualized support of the patronage recipient,
may be doubted.
It might have been uncertainty as to the validity of the state's interest
in maintaining the two-party system, and the ability of that system to
function without patronage, that prompted the plurality to interweave the
"vital state interest-least restrictive means" analysis, characteristic of
recent first amendment cases, 27 with the explicit "balancing" favored in
older decisions. 28 The plurality did not hesitate in finding that other
methods of promoting governmental efficiency and policy implementa29
tion, less drastic than widespread partisan dismissals, were available.
However, the opinion seemed to struggle with the last profferred justification and merely suggested that, in light of existing alternatives available to
fill party coffers and man election campaigns, the political process should
function as well without patronage.3 Though this conclusion might have
been sufficient to dispose of the issue on a "least restrictive means" basis,
the plurality went on to weigh what they thought to be the competing
interests involved and reached what may actually be an alternative basis
for the decision.
The plurality, in effect, articulated a hierarchy of first amendment
rights. Patronage, they concluded, is an aspect of political campaigning
and management, activities protected by the first amendment as necessary
to and perhaps the reason for the existence of parties, themselves manifestations of the right to associate. 3' Nevertheless, if partisan activity
abridges the individual's freedom to believe and affiliate as he chooses, it
must yield since it is a right derived from and subsidiary to the very
rise of special interest groups (e.g., labor unions) that will contribute money to
party coffers and manpower during elections in return for political favors.
27. The standard assiduously avoids any express balancing of interests. The
state is only required to articulate a governmental interest which the Court considers "compelling"; the Court then inquires whether the regulation in question is the
narrowest means of furthering that end. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,
58-59 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960); Bruff, UnconstitutionalConditions upon Public Employment: New Departuresin the Protectionof FirstAmendment Rights, 21 HAST. L. J.

129 (1969). However, it is arguable that in accepting a state interest as compelling,
the Court is, in fact, balancing the competing interests sub silentio. See generally
Note, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
28. See, e.g., American Comm. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 381 (1950); United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
29. 96 S. Ct. at 2685-87.
30. Id. at 2687-88.
31. Id. at 2688-89.
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freedom it threatens. 32 Thus, the plurality reasoned that Elrod was not
contrary to the decisions upholding the Hatch Act, 33 as the appellants had
contended; rather, those cases mandated the result since they only validated restraints on the political activities of federal employees in order to
safeguard those employees' right of free association. In essence, the
plurality seemed to conclude that it is the individual, not parties, who is
the bulwark of the democratic process and
whose interests are therefore
34
paramount in the constitutional scheme.
It remains to be seen just how effective the decision will prove as a
deterrent to other patronage practices .3 Although the plurality often
lapsed into sweeping language implying that the patronage system is
unconstitutional in its entirety, 36 both the holding and the concurrence are
explicitly limited to partisan discharge of non-policymaking public employees. 3 Thus patronage hiring may still be permissible, perhaps by
reasoning that the burden on first amendment rights is not as significant
when the state action is a passive failure to hire a member of the other
party as opposed to discharging him from employment solely on partisan
grounds.3 1 Practically, termination of one's present job would often work
a greater hardship, and be more coercive, than inability to secure a desired
32. Id. Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943): "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith -therein."
33. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Both cases
upheld provisions of the Hatch Act which prohibited federal employees from taking
part in certain partisan political activities to prevent the use of their services to
ensure the incumbency of the party in power. Employees remain free to vote and
affiliate with the party of their choice, unlike workers under the patronage system.
34. It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan, who wrote the plurality
decision in Elrod, and Justice Marshall, who concurred in that opinion, both joined
in dissenting from the result in the 1973 Hatch Act case which they rely on in Elrod;
they argued that the provisions in question were overbroad. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 595, 598 (1973).
35. The dissent believed that the entire patronage system had been dealt a
death blow by the decision in Elrod. 96 S.Ct. at 2696 n.10.
36. Id. at 2686-88.
37. Id. at 2689, 2690.
38. The pointedly limited holding of the two concurring Justices may indicate
that they will switch sides should a case arise challenging other aspects of patronage; more likely, it signifies a judicious reluctance to deal with a constitutional issue
not properly before the Court.
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position. Should the courts recognize such an "active-passive" distinction, not only unclassified employment, but also awards of those government contracts not subject to public bidding laws, and a generally more
receptive official ear may still be available to reward the party faithful."
Even for the victims of patronage discharge, all problems have not
been solved by Elrod. Unless politicians are foolish enough to indulge in
mass firings immediately upon assumption of office,'° a dismissed worker
will have a difficult burden proving that the sole motivation for his
discharge was his political affiliation since he is entitled to neither written
reasons nor an administrative hearing prior to termination. 41 Prospectively, Elrod v. Burns may be a decision that advocates of political patronage
can live with, albeit somewhat uncomfortably, as a barrier only to the
system's more obvious and flagrant constitutional violations.
Bill Steffes
39. But cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960).
40. See note 4, supra.
41. See the text and notes 12-13, supra. See Illinois State Employees Union v.

Lewis, 473 F.2d 561,579 (7th Cir. 1972) (Campbell, J., concurring), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 928 (1973); Note, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1090, 1098 (1973).

